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STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN E. MAXFIELD, as Guardian 
ad Litem for LAURIE ANN MAX-
FIELD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH 0. FISHLER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff for special and gen-
eral damages resulting from the Defendant's negligence 
in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as a 
Medical Doctor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss the action for failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute 
I Case No. 
| 13955 
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the action. Said Motion was granted at the time of trial 
when the Plaintiff's parents and attorney were present 
and ready to proceed with trial. The Court further de-
nied the Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. From the 
Orders of the Court granting the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss for failure to prosecute and denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for a New Trial the Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this Court reverse the Order of 
the trial court and grant the Plaintiff an opportunity 
to have her case heard on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff, LAURIE ANN MAXFIELD was born 
December 10, 1967 in Salt Lake City, Utah and was 
attended and treated by the Defendant as her physician 
for approximately three years after her birth (R-110). 
At the time of the Plaintiff's birth the Defendant ex-
amined the Plaintiff and in his report indicated, accord-
ing to the hospital records signed by the Defendant, that 
the Plaintiff was normal in all respects and so indicated 
specifically in regards to the infant's genitalia (R-28). 
The Defendant examined the infant not only at birth 
but many times over a three year period as her pedia-
trician (R-110). The defect was observable through 
external physical examination (R-110) (R-21). From 
birth until the time of corrective surgery, performed on 
or about October 22, 1970, Defendant failed to observe 
or recommend surgery to correct a constant wetting situ-
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ation with the child. On October 22, 1970 surgery was 
performed by Dr. P. Clark to correct this problem (R-21). 
Urinary problems continued and the Plaintiff was ad-
mitted to St. Joseph Hospital and Medical Center in 
Phoenix, Arizona and on April 17, 1972, Dr. Moberly per-
formed an aptoscopy and urethral dialation in hopes of 
discovering the cause of the lower urinary irritation (R-
58). At the time of this examination the Doctor dis-
covered that surgery had corrected the external problems 
but there continued to exist a hypoplastic condition of 
the ureteral orifices (R-60). As a result of the belated 
discovery of the need for surgery the Plaintiff suffered 
a great deal of pain and inconvenience for the first three 
years of her life and in addition her hypoplastic urethral 
condition continues to this day causing a recurrent uri-
nary infection with accompanying irritative symptoms 
(R-37). 
Shortly after the Plaintiff's parents sought the coun-
sel of their attorney the Plaintiff and her family moved 
to Phoenix, Arizona (R-18). After moving to Phoenix, 
Arizona, their home was flooded and many of their rec-
ords were lost and destroyed (R-18). As a result of this 
condition and many others (R-19) there was some delay 
between the time of the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint 
and delay in answering certain discovery of the Defen-
dants and in the prosecution of Plaintiff's discovery. How-
ever, the cause was set for trial on October 29, 1974. The 
Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Boyd M. Full-
mer, who was present in court and her parents, Susan E. 
Maxfield and Steven K. Maxfield were present in court. 
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(R-13). The Plaintiff moved for a continuance to allow 
the presence of a witness, Dr. Clark, which Motion for 
Continuance was denied (R-15). The Plaintiff moved 
the Court for leave to add the child's parents as parties 
Plaintiff, which Motion was denied (R-15). The Defen-
dant then moved for an Order of Dismissal for failure to 
prosecute this action under the provisions of Rule 41 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court 
granted said Motion (R-15). The Plaintiff was repre-
sented at the time of the trial by her attorney and her 
mother and father were present and in court prepared 
to testify. The Defendant was also present and was 
capable of being called as an adverse and hostile witness 
(R-18). Without giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to 
proceed with trial, when the trial was set and the jury 
called, the Court granted the Motion of the Defendant 
to dismiss for want of prosecution (R-13). 
On the 11th day of November, 1974 the Defendant 
moved for a new trial on the ground that the Court had 
erred in failing to allow the Plaintiff to proceed with trial 
when the Plaintiff's parents and attorney were present 
and ready to proceed (R-16). The Court heard argument 
of Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial on the 12th day of 
December, 1974, and found that the Court had not abused 
its discretion in entering its Order of Dismissal (R-5) 
and the Court entered its written Order denying Plain-
tiff's Motion for a New Trial on the 19th day of December, 
1974 (R-5). From the above Orders of the Court the De-
fendant entered its Notice of Appeal on the 31st day of 
December, 1974 (R-3). 
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THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
In its Order of Dismissal entered October 29th, 1974 
the Court ordered "that Defendant's Motion for an Or-
der of Dismissal for failure to prosecute this action under 
the provisions of Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure be and the same is hereby granted and this action 
is dismissed (R-15)." Unless the Court otherwise speci-
fies, except where dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction, 
improper venue, or lack of indispensable party, dismissal 
under Rule 41 (b) operates as an adjudication on the 
merits. * 
In reviewing a dismissal under Rule 41 (b), the 
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff. In the case of Martin v. Stevens, 121 
Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747 (1952), the Court stated, 
In appraising the dismissal which was granted 
against the Plaintiff, he is entitled to have us re-
view all of the evidence together with every logi-
cal inference which may fairly be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to him. 
This rule was reaffirmed in Evans v. Butters, 16 Utah 
2d 272, 399 P. 2d 210 (1965), wherein the Count, citing 
the Martin case supra, said, "Wherever there is conflict 
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we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff." 
It is the well established policy of the Courts to 
allow a party to have his day in court whenever possible. 
The principal object desired in all cases is the searching 
out of the truth and doing justice between the parties. 
To carry out that purpose it is the policy of the law to 
favor a trial on the merits and to afford both parties a 
full opportunity to present their evidence to the best of 
their ability so that the controversy may be disposed of 
on a substantial rather than technical ground. In the 
case of McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P. 2d 129 (1966), the Court set forth 
the above general policy of the law and then went on to 
say, 
In order to achieve the objectives just stated, it 
is sometimes necessary to look beyond what may 
appear to be ill-advised, or even irritating and 
contemptuous conduct of counsel to the adjudi-
cation of the rights of the parties to the action. 
It should be kept in mind that their rights and 
any such misconduct of counsel are separate and 
distinct things which should be dealt with sepa-
rately. 
The case of Bunting Tractor Co., Inc. v. Emmett 
D. Ford Contractors, Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P„ 2d 191 
(1954), involved a dismissal under Rule 41 (b) because 
of Plaintiff's failure to file a non-resident cost bond 
within one month after demand as required by Rule 
12 (k). The Supreme Court held that the dismissal with 
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prejudice was an abuse of discretion and modified the 
dismissal to be without prejudice. The Court based its 
modifications on two factors: (1) The dismissal was based 
on actions by Plaintiff which were technical and did not 
go to the merits of the case. (2) The bond was posted 
after the 30-day limit but before Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, so that Defendant suffered no harm. Because 
of these factors, the Court felt that the dismissal with 
prejudice was inconsistent with the philosophy behind 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. That philosophy was 
stated thusly by the Court: 
The general philosophy of the new Rules of 
Civil Procedure is that liberality should be in-
dulged to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action. (Footnote to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1(a)). In con-
struing and applying these rules it should be the 
purpose of the Courts to afford litigants every 
reasonable opportunity to be heard on the merits 
of their cases. This policy is not an innovation 
to our law. It has long been embodied both in 
the statutes and decisions that deviation from 
form and procedure shall not work a forfeiture 
of substantive rights in the absence of prejudice 
to the opposing party. 
To have allowed the parties to proceed with the trial 
would not have been prejudicial to the Defendant. 
The Federal Courts have also construed Rule 41 (b) 
in favor of giving a litigant his day in Court. In Davis 
v. Operation Amigo, Inc., 378 F. 2d 101 (10th Cir., 1967), 
a dismissal for failure to prosecute was reversed where 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it occurred less than four months from the date the case 
was filed. In making its reversal, the Court noted the 
general rule that the exercise of the power to dismiss 
by the trial judge is discretionary and should be sus-
tained upon appeal in the absence of abuse. However, 
dismissal is a harsh sanction and should be resorted to 
only in extreme cases. The judge must be ever mindful 
that the policy of the law favors the hearing of the liti-
gant's claim upon the merits. These policies were also 
substantiated in the case of Meeker v. Rizley, 325 F. 2d 
269 (10th Cir., 1963). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has given a list 
of factors which should be considered in a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute. These factors are set out in the case 
of States Steamship Co. v. Philippine Airlines, 426 F. 2d 
803 (9th Cir., 1970), which said the following factors 
should be weighed: 
1) The Plaintiff's right to a hearing on the claim. 
2) The impairment of the Defendant's defenses 
which is presumed from the unreasonable delay. 
3) The wholesome policy of the law in favor of the 
prompt disposition of law suits. 
4) The duty of the Plaintiff to proceed with due 
diligence. 
Based upon the policy of giving a party his day in 
court and weighing the four factors mentioned above, it 
would appear that the dismissal in this case was too harsh 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a sanction under the circumstances and amounted to an 
abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRO-
CEED WITH TRIAL. 
Although the Plaintiff would have preferred to have 
the trial continued, both Mr. and Mrs. Maxfield and their 
counsel were present in Court and ready to proceed. In-
stead of allowing them to proceed after the denial of the 
Motion for Continuance the action was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. Nowhere in its search for authority 
on this point can counsel for the Appellant find author-
ity to uphold a dismissal in these circumstances. 
There are two types of cases which must be dis-
tinguished from the case at hand. (1) In many states 
the rules of civil procedure provide that a case will be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute if it is not brought to 
trial within a certain time period, usually within two 
years after the filing of the complaint. There are cases 
in which the Plaintiff and his counsel were in court and 
ready to proceed yet a dismissal for failure to prosecute 
was upheld because the time limit for bringing the action 
provided in the rules or by statute had lapsed. These 
cases, of which there are several, are obviously distinguish-
able from the case at hand. (2) Another type of case 
in which dismissal has been upheld, even though plain-
tiff and his counsel were in court and ready to proceed, 
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is in the situation where the plaintiff did not give notice 
of his readiness for trial until after he had been served 
with a notice of the Motion for Dismissal. Again, this 
is distinguishable from the case at hand where plaintiff 
was present in court with jurors and the officers of the 
court ready to proceed before the Motion for Dismissal 
was made. 
Since the adoption of the current Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938, after which Utah's Rule 41 (b) 
is patterned, there has been no federal case upholding 
a dismissal for failure to prosecute where the plaintiff 
and his counsel were present in court and ready to pro-
ceed with the trial. Since 1916, no state cases could be 
found upholding such a dismissal in this situation. There 
are no Utah cases upholding it. 
There are several cases in state courts which have 
held that a dismissal in these circumstances is improper. 
Because the injustice of such a dismissal is so obvious, 
most of the cases are brief per curiam opinions. 
The case of Rios v. New York City Transit Author-
ity, 35 A. D. 2d 804, 315 N. Y. S. 2d 730 (1970), is typi-
cal of such cases. When that case was called on the cal-
endar by the trial court, plaintiff's attorney submitted 
an affidavit of actual engagement of trial counsel and 
requested an adjournment which was denied. Counsel 
then requested the case be marked either ready subject 
to trial counsel's engagement or ready for trial. The trial 
court instead dismissed the action. The appellate court 
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vacated the dismissal in a per curiam opinion and ruled 
that it was an improvident exercise of discretion. 
In the case of Stanley v. Pryde W. Basinger & Co., 
265 N. C. 718,144 S. E. 2d 861 (1965), the case was tried 
but the verdict was set aside as against the weight of 
the evidence on May 18, 1961. Neither Plaintiff nor De-
fendant took any action to move the case to trial and 
it was eventually placed on a "clean-up calendar" in 
March, 1965. Upon notice of this action, the Defendant 
requested that the case be dismissed upon its call on the 
clean-up calendar. The case was called on March 18, 
1965r and the Plaintiff and his counsel were present and 
ready to proceed. Upon inquiry by the Court as to why 
the case had not been tried, Plaintiff's counsel replied 
that "there had not been much involved and nobody 
pushed it." The case was thereupon nonsuited for failure 
to prosecute. The ruling was reversed in a brief per 
curiam opinion which explained that if the plaintiff had 
failed to appear or refused to proceed when so ordered, 
the Court would have inherent power to dismiss the ac-
tion. But when the plaintiff was present and ready for 
trial when his case was called, the judge was without 
authority to dismiss the action. 
The case of Ayers v. D. F. Quillen & Sons, Inc., 188 
A. 2d 510 (Del., 1963), expanded this concept by the 
Court ruling that an action should not be dismissed 
where it is being diligently prosecuted, even though its 
prosecution has been neglected at a prior time. The com-
plaint in the Ayers case was filed February 2, 1951, and 
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Plaintiff filed a stipulation extending, without termina-
tion date, the time in which Defendant was required to 
answer the complaint. Plaintiff served notice of a Mo-
tion for Entry of Judgment by Default for failure to 
plead or otherwise answer on June 26, 1960. Prior to 
that time, neither party had taken any action on the 
matter. On July 22, 1960, the Defendant moved to dis-
miss for failure to prosecute under Rule 41 (b). The 
Court held that a motion to dismiss for failure to prose-
cute will not be granted if the Plaintiff is diligently prose-
cuting his claim even though at some prior time he has 
been guilty of gross negligence. Plaintiff's filing of the 
Motion for Default Judgment prior to Defendant's Mo-
tion to Dismiss constituted diligent prosecution of his 
claim. If this action was sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment of diligent prosecution, surely being present in 
court and ready to proceed with trial at the appointed 
time meets this requirement and precludes dismissal 
under this rule. 
It has even been held that it is not necessary for 
Plaintiff to be present at time of trial but only has coun-
sel in order to preclude a dismissal for failure to prose-
cute. In a syllabus opinion in Franks v. Reid, 128 Ga. 
App. 454, 197 S. E. 2d 156 (Ct. of App,, 1973), the Court 
held that where counsel for Plaintiff announced he was 
ready for trial, it was error for the trial court to dismiss 
the action for want of prosecuition based on the fact that 
the Plaintiff himself was not present. 
When coupled with the well established policy of the 
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Utah courts to give a litigant his day in court whenever 
possible, these cases provide a clear indication that the 
dismissal in the present case when the parties were pres-
ent in court and ready to proceed, the jury had been 
called and the Court was scheduled to hear the case, is 
contrary to the purposes of Rule 41 (b) and totally con-
trary to the Rules of Civil Procedure as they work an 
injustice upon the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
This case constitutes a clear and absolute abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court. Under present 
day rules it seems incomprehensible that a Court would 
not allow the parties to proceed with the trial of their 
case. 
The Court should therefore reverse the District 
Court's Order and allow the parties to try the case upon 
its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FULLMER & HARDING 
540 East Fifth South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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